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Abstract 
 
 The ability to network machinery and devices that 
are otherwise isolated is highly attractive to industry. 
This has led to growth in the use of cyber-physical 
systems (CPSs) with existing infrastructure. However, 
coupling physical and cyber processes leaves CPSs 
vulnerable to security attacks. A threat-vulnerability 
based risk model is developed through a detailed 
analysis of CPS security attack structures and threats. 
The Stuxnet malware attack is used to test the viability 
of the proposed model. An analysis of the Natanz 
system shows that, with an actual case security-risk 
score at Mitigation level 5, the infested facilities barely 
avoided a situation worse than the one which occurred. 
The paper concludes with a discussion on the need for 
risk analysis as part of CPS security and highlights the 
future work of modelling and comparing existing 
security solutions using the proposed model so to 
identify the sectors where CPS security is still lacking. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
  
 In recent years, the advent of the Internet of Things 
has seen industrial applications moving from wired 
networking interfaces towards wireless and hybrid 
networking solutions. One such example is a cyber-
physical system (CPS) which uses a combination of 
sensors, actuators, communication networks and cyber 
processing to facilitate learning, decision-making and 
self-actuation in multiple domains. CPSs tightly 
integrate cyber and physical processes; introducing 
new security challenges and vulnerabilities. With the 
increasing prevalence of cyber-crime, the protection of 
industrial and infrastructural networks is of an 
increasingly growing priority.  
 The development of efficient CPS security 
solutions is made difficult by the complexities and 
challenges unique to these networks. One example of 
this is the limited computing resources available to 
CPS devices. Security solutions need to be able to 
account for the tight constraints and work efficiently 
and effectively without the complete depletion of 
available resources. It is therefore necessary to 
thoroughly investigate CPS architecture, the 
application domains in which a CPS may be utilised 
and the security challenges that need to be addressed in 
order to facilitate the development of specialised 
security solutions. 
 CPSs have security challenges different to those 
found in traditional IT systems. Attempts at mapping 
solutions from other sectors of networking such as 
sensor networks have been made with various degrees 
of success; however, as the solutions were not 
originally intended for CPSs, they often fail to meet all 
the security needs required by the system [23]. To this 
end, an analysis of the security holes occurring within 
CPSs is needed in order to identify in which areas a 
CPS is affected by a security attack and the extent of 
potential damage that may occur in the event of a 
successful attack 
 The main problem faced is in understanding the 
detailed operation interactions of the physical and 
cyber processes within a CPS and how they contribute 
to introducing security vulnerabilities. This 
understanding is necessary in order to develop 
successful security solutions that are able to provide 
maximum system security with minimum overhead. 
CPS security frameworks and architectures need to be 
to incorporate a variety of needs at the design level 
such as the precision required by the computing 
applications in a CPS for interfacing with the 
uncertainty and noise generated in a physical 
environment. For the context of this research, noise is 
defined as the random variation that may be present in 
measured values owing to interferences from the 
physical environment and the inherent manufacturing 
differences between components and devices. The 
occurrence of this variation leads to a percentage of 
error that is associated with the accuracy of each 
measurement. This error is defined as uncertainty.   
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 The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: 
Section 2 provides a detailed background on CPSs. 
Section 3 proposes a risk model based upon the threats 
and attack model identified in Section 2. Section 4 
gives an implementation test of the model and the 
results thereof. Section 5 discusses the need for risk 
analysis as a necessary part of CPS security and 
identifies the contributions made towards CPS security 
by the proposed model. Section 6 concludes the paper 
and identifies the additional testing of the model’s 
viability that shall be conducted as the model is 
improved upon as part of continuing work. 
 
2. Background 
 
Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) are a networked 
collection of “actuators, sensors, control processing 
units and communication devices” [4] designed to 
interface with physical and cyber processes to form 
part of a larger, distributed system [4], [19]. The 
operations in a CPS are aimed at monitoring the 
behaviours of the physical environment in order to 
achieve certain goals, such as effective resource 
allocation or early warning signalling, with actuation 
being based upon the results of computation processes 
performed at the cyber core [23]. The cyber core of a 
CPS consists of “computational availability that 
monitors, coordinates and controls the physical 
system” [2] and is found within the cyber domain.  
 
 
Figure 1: Cyber-physical system architecture 
The unique operational structure of a CPS is 
detailed in Figure 1. Typically, a CPS utilises 
distributed control and management mechanisms in 
order to connect components into a networked 
configuration. Using a combination of wired and 
wireless communications, sensor data is sent into the 
cyber domain for concurrent processing and actuation 
[22]. Computing results are then sent from the cyber 
core into physical components in order to effectively 
facilitate machine learning, system adaptability and 
network self-assembly and self-organisation [22]. This 
integration of physical and cyber processes — 
indicated as red double arrows in Figure 1 — results in 
the predictable behaviour and real-time operation seen 
in CPSs.  
The use of CPSs is becoming more prevalent in 
industry owing to the capability to network systems 
that are ordinarily isolated from the cyber core [3]. 
Examples of the CPS’s application domains include 
smart resource and infrastructure management, 
emergency detection and response systems, smart 
health care and smart manufacturing infrastructure  
[16], [22]. The increase in prevalence of CPSs 
highlights the increasing priority for effective security 
solutions. As part of understanding the security needs 
of CPSs, a scalable, risk analysis and quantification 
model is needed in order to assist in the faster 
identification of high priority CPS vulnerabilities for 
which security solutions are required. Wu et al [25] 
proposed a risk quantification model for CPSs in 2015. 
The model specifies the security risks in CPSs and 
their interdependencies as vulnerability dependency 
graphs based upon the structure of directed acyclic 
graphs. The graphs are then utilised to calculate the 
system risk to illustrate which area(s) of the CPS 
would form the optimal attack target [25]. The problem 
with the use of acyclic graphs is that, as the number of 
threats and vulnerabilities found in a system increases, 
the graph size rapidly grows until it becomes too 
complicated for practical use. This limits the scalability 
of the model for larger industrial systems. 
 The threat-vulnerability risk model proposed by the 
authors in this paper is easily scalable and can be 
applied to either the individual sectors of a CPS — 
such as the sensor or communication networks — or to 
a CPS as a whole unit without needing any 
implementation changes to the methodology and 
without the excessive growth of the model. 
 
3. CPS risk model 
The coupling of cyber and physical processes in a 
CPS exposes various security vulnerabilities and 
threats that may be utilised in the event of a cyber-
physical attack. These attacks can be of a similar 
nature to traditional cyber-attacks and may be broken 
down into five main stages: access, discovery and 
reconnaissance, infiltration, damage and clean up [9]. 
From the analysis conducted in [8], [9], [25], and [26], 
the authors have identified five general-form CPS 
threats, based upon the general characteristics and 
behaviours exploited and the resultant damage caused 
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to the system, as the foundation upon which the 
proposed model has been developed. These identified 
security threats are categorised as system behaviour 
alteration, denial of service, deception, network 
alteration and eavesdropping. The threats are seen to 
occur in the physical, communication and cyber 
components of the system and are categorised based 
upon the range of attacks with which the system may 
be faced along with the results thereof in the event of a 
successful attack. 
 In order to facilitate future, efficient development 
of critical CPS security solutions, the proposed model 
aims to provide a uniform methodology with which to 
identify the threats and vulnerabilities that need to be 
addressed urgently in addition to providing a 
quantitative scale against which one can compare the 
effectiveness of the developed solutions.   
 
3.1. Risk analysis variables 
 
 As part of conducting a thorough risk analysis on a 
CPS, a variety of system characteristics are considered 
towards the calculation of the impact a threat-
vulnerability risk will have, overall, on the CPS. These 
characteristics were identified in accordance to the 
anatomy of a cyber-physical security attack and the 
security threats previously identified. The variables are 
chosen as the characteristics most often used by 
attackers in order to efficiently compromise a CPS.  
The risk impact (RI) of a security threat or 
vulnerability is defined as the resultant damage to a 
CPS owing to the successful exploitation of a security 
threat or vulnerability. For a CPS threat/vulnerability, 
the risk impact is calculated with the consideration of 
the following factors: 
 EP: the entry point score. This score gives an 
overview of the degree of openness of the CPS.  
 AP: the physical access score. This score quantifies 
the time needed for infiltration using entry points 
leading into the physical domain of the CPS or 
through physical intrusions by humans into the 
system. 
 AC: the cyber access score. This score quantifies 
the time needed for infiltration using the entry 
points leading into the cyber domain of the CPS.  
 CF: the consequence factor associated with the 
resultant damage caused during and after a 
successful attack. Calculation of the consequence 
factor is based upon the damage caused to the 
system, to the environment and to human life. 
The variables used in the calculation of the 
consequence factor (CF) are weighted in order to 
provide a translation of the severity of the damage 
considered.   
 System damage (DS) considers results such 
as the mechanical damage done to the 
compromised component and other system 
components within the affected sector of the 
CPS as a result of a successful attack and the 
operational delay that may occur in the 
system. 
 Environmental damage (DE) considers the 
damage that may occur to the surrounding 
ecosystems owing to unintended emissions 
from the facility utilising the CPS. 
 Damage caused to human life (DH) 
considers the potential for injury or the loss 
of life as a result of the compromised CPS 
and is given the most weight. This variable 
considers the damage that could be done to 
operational personnel, system end users and 
bystanders.  
 PSR: the potential for complete system recovery 
following a successful attack. This score is in line 
with the degree of clean up done by the attackers 
and the degree of clean up needed for the system 
to resume uninhibited operation.  
  
3.2. Risk scoring 
 
For the purposes of the proposed model, the risk 
scoring is primarily based upon the overall cost to the 
company utilising CPSs in the event of a successful 
attack. The cost may be calculated in terms of loss of 
operational time, time spent on the recovery of data, 
loss of data, sensed or stored, during system downtime 
and monetary costs. These costs could be accrued in 
the form of personnel pay-outs, clean-up operation 
costs, the cost of abandoning facilities in cases of 
irrecoverable damage or the cost of replacements and 
repairs to damaged physical systems.  
The scales allocated for the model variables have 
been chosen for easier interpretation and can be 
changed to more appropriate scales in individual cases 
of risk analysis. However, it is important to observe the 
weights allocated to each variable to ensure that the 
total is split correctly amongst the variables. In the 
proposed risk model, the risk impact score is calculated 
as a total out of 100. This total is split between the four 
main variables EP, AP, AC and CF. CF, as the variable 
with the most weight amongst the four variables, has a 
total score double to that of the other three variables 
and is calculated as a score out of 40. CF is given 
double the weight of the entry and access variables as 
it is an indicator of the physical damage that can occur 
to the CPS; the most important of which is the damage 
that may occur to employees and bystanders. 
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The remainder of the risk impact total is split 
evenly between EP, AP and AC with a score out of 20 
for each.  
 
3.2.1. The entry points (EP) score. The EP score is 
determined by the total number of unsecured, 
potentially exploitable entry points into the CPS. Some 
examples of exploitable entry points are given below  
[11],  [18]: 
 Number of devices that have been infected. 
 Number of development backdoors and holes in 
the network perimeter. 
 Number of unsecured/forgotten infrastructure e.g. 
modems connected to physical machines, dial-up 
access to remote terminal units (RTUs), field 
equipment modems. 
 Number of accessible connection hijacking points 
within network. 
 Number of compromised, outsourced firmware, 
software and equipment. 
 Number of ‘trusted’ ports of the system e.g. USB 
ports, Ethernet cards, battery monitors. 
The score for the entry point variable is determined 
using proportional scoring. The minimum and 
maximum values are mapped along the scale of 0 to 20 
where 0 is indicative of a completely secured system 
with no exploitable entry points and 20 is indicative of 
a completely open, unsecured system where all entry 
points are exploitable gateways into the system. A 
scale of 20 was chosen as a result of the division of the 
final risk score — given on a scale of 0 to 100 — 
amongst its four variables. The authors note however 
that any scale may be utilised if applied uniformly 
across all the risk model variables and with the 
necessary adjustments being made to the maximum 
values for the PSR and risk impact variables. 
In order to calculate the EP score, two additional 
metrics are required:  
 MAXE: This is the total number of entry points 
into the CPS both secured and unsecured. This 
number is dependent on the size of the CPS under 
analysis. 
 UNSECE: This is the total number of entry points 
into the CPS that are unsecured.  
Using the proportion of UNSECE to MAXE, the EP 
score, as a result out of 20, can be calculated by: 
 
EP = 
𝑈𝑁𝑆𝐸𝐶𝐸
𝑀𝐴𝑋𝐸
 × 20 
 
The use of proportional scoring aids in illustrating 
how close or far the system is from being completely 
open to exploitation. A score closer to the mapped 
minimum is indicative of a more closed, secure system 
while a score closer to the mapped maximum is 
indicative of a more accessible, vulnerable system.  
Proportional scoring for the entry point count is 
also used in an attempt to try and generalise the 
differences between CPSs or within various sectors of 
a CPS, resulting in a wider range of applicability for 
the model. This is needed because the number of entry 
points may differ from system to system or the number 
may differ from sector to sector. Some systems may 
have a smaller number of system entry points while 
some may have a larger number of entry points as a 
result of the sizes of the systems. Proportional scoring 
allocates a score based on the proportion of the 
unsecured count against the relative maximum;  
allowing for the same degree of urgency to be 
conveyed by the EP score, regardless of the scale of the 
system. 
 
3.2.2. The access (AP and AC) scores. The scores for 
the AP and AC variables are determined from the entry 
points identified for the calculation of EP. For these 
variables, the entry points are further divided into the 
relevant systems — the physical or cyber systems — 
that they primarily affect when exploited.  
For the unsecure access points, the average time-to-
compromise (TTC) would need to be determined. 
Multiplication of the average TTC by the number of 
identified access points would make up the 
intermediary scores of TTCP and TTCC.  
TTC is defined as the estimated time taken by an 
attacker of a particular skillset to successfully infiltrate 
a targeted system [17]. For the purposes of the AP and 
AC scores, the TTC should be estimated for an attacker 
of average skillset with access to standard tools and 
hardware however; the facility exists for the score to be 
determined for a more skilled attacker with access to 
more sophisticated tools.  
A variety of techniques may be used in order to 
determine the TTC. Estimation techniques have been 
proposed by LeMay et al. [14], Leversage and Byres 
[15], and McQueen et al. [17]. These techniques may 
be used to determine the TTC of the access points. The 
TTC can also be determined as part of system testing 
by the testing engineers of the CPS.  
As with the determination of the EP score, 
proportional scoring, on a scale of 0 to 20, is used to 
determine the scores for AP and AC. For both variables, 
zero time taken for a successful exploitation is mapped 
to 20 while the maximum time taken for a successful 
exploitation is mapped to 0. The value for the 
maximum time is determined as the average time taken 
to brute force entry into the system.  
In order to determine AP and AC, the following 
metrics are utilised: 
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 NP: the number of unsecured, physical system entry 
points. This number is a subset of the number of 
entry points identified as part of UNSECE. 
 NC: the number of unsecured, cyber system entry 
points. This number is also a subset of the number 
of entry point identified as part of UNSECE. 
 TTCPi: The average TTC for a physical system 
entry point. 
 TTCCj: The average TTC for a cyber system entry 
point. 
 TTCP:  TTC𝑃𝑖  ×  𝑁𝑃 
 TTCC: TTCCi  ×  𝑁𝐶  
 MAXPi: The average brute force entry time for 
physical domain entry points. 
 MAXCi: The average brute force entry time for 
cyber domain entry points.  
 MAXP: MAXPi  × 𝑁𝑃 
 MAXC: MAXCi  ×  𝑁𝐶  
The scores for AP and AC are calculated as follows: 
AP = 20 − ( 
𝑇𝑇𝐶𝑃
𝑀𝐴𝑋𝑃
 × 20) 
 
AC =  20 − (
𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶
𝑀𝐴𝑋𝐶
 × 20) 
 
In the case of the two variables defined above, 
proportional scoring gives a quantification of the ease 
with which an unsecured entry point can be 
compromised. Scores closer to twenty are indicative of 
entry points that are quickly compromised while scores 
closer to zero are indicative of entry points that are 
harder to compromise. One may find there are 
unsecured entry points that could, relatively, take 
longer to compromise in order to gain entry into the 
system as opposed to other entry points. The priority in 
securing these entry points could then be lower than 
the priority for the entry points that are more easily 
compromised and thus more likely to be exploited.  
 
3.2.3.  The consequence factor (CF). The 
consequence factor is made up of three variables: 
Damage to human life (DH), Environmental Damage 
(DE) and System Damage (DS), which contribute to a 
total score of 40. DH is given the largest weight and 
constitutes 50% of the CF total. It is allocated along a 
scale of 0 to 20. DE is given the second-highest weight 
and constitutes 30% of the CF.  It allocated a score 
along a scale of 0 to 12, where a score of 0 reflects no 
environmental damage as a result of the security failure 
and a score of 12 reflects irreversible, irrecoverable 
environmental damage. DS is given the lowest weight 
and thus constitutes 20% of the CF. 
The DS score is allocated along a scale of 0 to 8. 
Should no damage occur to the system, a score of 0 is 
to be given and severe, irreparable damage is allocated 
a score of 8. The score allocation is based on the 
percentage of the system that is reparable and the 
percentage of the system that would be written off and 
replaced; the cost of which is borne by the company 
utilising the CPS. It can be seen from Table 1 that 
these percentages are the inverses of each other.  
The scoring for DS is given as follows.  
Table 1: Risk scoring for system damage (DS) 
Percentage 
Repairable 
Percentage 
Written off 
Risk Score 
0% 0% 0.0 
100% 0% 0.5 
99-80% 1-20% 1.0 
79-60% 21-40% 2.0 
59-40% 41-60% 4.0 
39-20% 61-80% 6.0 
19-0% 81-100% 8.0 
The score for DE is allocated based on the 
associated cost of the damage caused to the 
environment as a result of the failure of a CPS in the 
event of a security attack. This cost is often determined 
by the international liability conventions for the 
various sectors in which CPSs are employed. An 
example of one such convention, within the nuclear 
energy sector, is the 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil 
Liability for Nuclear Damage [10].  
The scale for DE is split into two categories in order 
to account for the majority of damage scenarios that 
may occur. The first half of the scale, 0 to 6, accounts 
for cases in which combinations of no damage and 
repairable damage have occurred to the environment 
surrounding the facility. The second half of the scale, 7 
to 12, accounts for cases in which combinations of 
repairable and irreparable damage has occurred to the 
environment surrounding the CPS facility. The score 
allocations are summarised in the tables below.  
Table 2: Environmental score for cases of 
repairable damage and no damage 
Percentage 
Repairable 
Percentage 
Undamaged 
Risk Score 
- ~100% 0.0 
1-10% ~90% 1.0 
11-20% ~80% 2.0 
21-40% ~60% 3.0 
41-60% ~40% 4.0 
61-80% ~20% 5.0 
81-100% 0% 6.0 
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Table 3: Environmental score for cases of 
repairable and irreparable damage 
Percentage 
Repairable 
Percentage 
Irreparable 
Risk Score 
~90% 1-10% 7.0 
~80% 11-20% 8.0 
~60% 21-40% 9.0 
~40% 41-60% 10.0 
~20% 61-80% 11.0 
~0% 81-100% 12.0 
DH is allocated a score along the scale of 0 to 20; 
with 0 indicating no occurrences of injury and a score 
of 20 indicating fatal injury to nearly all employees.  
The score allocated to DH is based upon the overall 
cost of compensation per employee injured in the event 
of a system failure. The compensation amount for 
occupational injury and disease differs from country to 
country and this calculation would need to be done in 
accordance with the compensation policies used per 
country. 
In the same manner that the EP, AC and AP scores 
are calculated; DH can be given as follows: 
 
DH = 
𝑇𝐶𝐸𝐼
𝑀𝐴𝑋𝑇𝐶
 × 20 
Where: 
 TCEI: Total compensation cost for employees 
actually injured. This is calculated by (the number 
of employees affected) x (average compensation 
per employee per annum). 
 MAXTC: Total compensation cost for all employees 
(injured and not). This is calculated by (the total 
number of employees)  x (average compensation 
per employee per annum). 
 
3.2.4.  The potential for system recovery (PSR) 
score. Traditionally, business disaster management 
techniques include the definitions of a Recovery Time 
Objective (RTO) and Recovery Point Objective (RPO) 
in order to set the recoverability standard required by 
the organisation [21]. The PSR score serves to provide 
a comparison point for a CPS’s actual capacity to 
recover from a disaster against the set RTO and RPO 
conditions as well as serving as a risk mitigation factor 
that reduces the overall impact of the security risk. As 
a result, the same scale used for the risk impact scoring 
is utilised for the PSR score.  
The PSR score is allocated along a scale of 0 to 
100, where systems with the potential to make a 
recovery with no loss of resources are allocated the 
highest score of 100 and where systems with no 
potential of recovery and a complete loss of resources 
are allocated the lowest score of 0. For the purpose of 
the PSR score, recoverability is defined as the 
percentage of the system operations that can be 
recovered after a security attack within the pre-
determined, allowed operation downtime period. If the 
PSR score of a security vulnerability or threat is high, 
then the risk associated with an exploitation of that 
security weakness is negated.  
A full breakdown of the PSR score allocation scale 
is given in Table 4. 
Table 4: Potential for system recovery (PSR) 
scoring 
Percentage 
recovery (%) 
PSR score Severity 
Indicator 
0 0.0 No recovery 
1-10 1.0 - 10.0 Very little recovery 
11-20 11.0 - 20.0  
21-30 21.0 - 30.0  
31-40 31.0 - 40.0  
41-50 41.0 - 50.0 Moderate recovery 
51-60 51.0 - 60.0  
61-70 61.0 - 70.0  
71-80 71.0 - 80.0  
81-90 81.0 - 90.0  
91-99 91.0 - 99.0 Near full recovery 
100 100.0 Full recovery 
 
3.3.  Risk quantification 
 
Taking into consideration the identified risk 
variables and the proposed scoring methodology, the 
risk associated with a security threat or vulnerability 
may be quantified using the analysis methodology 
given below.  
The CF of a security weakness, as a score out of 40, 
can be calculated by:  
 
CF = DS+ DE+ DH 
 
The risk impact (RI), as a score out of 100, is then 
given as: 
 
RI = EP + AP + AC + CF 
  
In order to quantify the severity of a security threat 
or vulnerability, RI is weighted against a probability 
factor (P) between 0.0 and 1.0. This is in consideration 
of cases where the probability of occurrence may be 
low, even when the resultant risk score for a threat or 
vulnerability may be high and vice versa. Such cases 
may be the result of a number of varying reasons. One 
example is the need for a highly specialised skillset in 
the development of the potential malware.  
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Allocation of the probability score needs to 
consider the environmental trends in the Information 
Security sector and the frequency and success rate of 
attacks on CPSs. An organisation’s attack desirability 
also needs to be taken into close consideration. Some 
sectors in industry are more desirable to attackers, such 
as government-run facilities, and could have a higher 
probability of a security attack occurring.  
The security risk score (SRS) for a CPS security 
threat or vulnerability can then be defined as: 
 
 SRS = P x [RI - PSR] 
 
In weighting the combined risk-recovery score 
against a probability score, a facility to associate 
urgency for the need of a successful security solution 
to a security threat/vulnerability is given. A top down 
approach may then be utilised, resulting in the faster 
development of solutions able to secure the most 
critical sectors in a CPS.    
 
3.4.  Interpreting the risk score 
The calculated risk score can be given as either a 
positive (+) or negative (-) number. A positive score is 
indicative of a risk that has not been mitigated by the 
system’s recoverability potential. In this case, the risk 
impact is greater than the system recoverability score 
and is interpreted against the Security Risk levels. A 
negative score is indicative of risk that has been 
mitigated by the system’s recoverability potential. This 
is a case where the system recoverability score is 
greater than the risk associated with the vulnerability 
or threat. These scores are interpreted against the Risk 
Mitigation levels.  
In order to determine the priority scales associated 
with the security risk and the risk mitigation, five CPS 
security attack cases are considered. The worst case 
scenario, (RI= 100), is a case in which all the variables 
are given the maximum scores possible for their 
associated scales. The best case scenario, (RI=0), is a 
case in which all the variables are given the minimum 
scores possible for their associated scales. The middle 
case scenario, (RI= 50), is a case in which all the 
variables are all set to the middle of their associated 
scales. The lower, (RI= 25), and upper, (RI= 75), 
quarter cases have their variable scores set along 25% 
and 75% of their scales, respectively. 
By varying the PSR score in increasing intervals of 
10% and the probability in increasing intervals of 0.25, 
the resultant scores were analysed and grouped 
together to form five priority and mitigation levels. The 
resultant priority scale is proposed with the levels of 
severity and mitigation being indicated in descending 
order: 
Table 5: Priority scale for security-risk and 
risk mitigation 
 
Security Risk 
levels 
Score 
Range 
Risk Mitigation 
levels 
  Priority 1 60-100   Mitigation 1 
  Priority 2 40-60   Mitigation 2 
  Priority 3 20-40   Mitigation 3 
  Priority 4 8-20   Mitigation 4 
  Priority 5 0-8   Mitigation 5 
Five priority levels are defined for the scores 
categorised as Security Risk.  
Priority 1 risks are defined as Near Catastrophic or 
Catastrophic failure risks where the vulnerability or 
threat has a very high probability of successful 
exploitation. Little to no recoverability would be 
possible in the event of a security attack with a very 
high probability of the occurrence of fatalities in the 
event of system failure.  
Priority 2 risks are defined as Serious failure risks 
where the vulnerability or threat has an above average 
chance of successful exploitation. Minor system 
recovery would be possible. The potential damage 
caused by the system failure is high with a high 
probability of serious, bordering life threatening, injury 
to the users and system bystanders. 
Similar to Priority 1 and 2 risks, Priority 3 to 5 
risks are defined respectively as Moderate failure risks, 
Minor failure risks, and Near to no or no failure risks.  
For the risk mitigation, five levels have also been 
defined, detailing the degree to which the risk 
associated with the threat/vulnerability has been 
mitigated. 
Mitigation level 1 is defined as Near to complete or 
complete risk mitigation. In this case, the risk 
associated with the vulnerability or threat is completely 
mitigated by the system recoverability and there exists 
little to no chance of the security weakness moving 
into a security risk priority level should the analysis 
conditions change.  
Mitigation level 2 is defined as High risk mitigation 
where the majority of the risk associated with the 
vulnerability or threat is mitigated by the system 
recoverability. Here, there also exists very little chance 
of the security weakness moving into a security risk 
priority level. 
Similar to Mitigation levels 1 and 2, Mitigation 
levels 3 to 5 are defined respectively as Moderate risk 
mitigation. Minor risk mitigation and Near to no risk 
mitigation. 
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4. Model testing 
 
In order to test the effectiveness of the developed 
risk model, a case study analysis of the well-known 
CPS attack called the Stuxnet worm has been 
conducted in order to try and assess the risk associated 
with the vulnerabilities exploited.  
Discovered in 2010, the Stuxnet worm targeted the 
control systems at an Iranian uranium refinery, Natanz 
[5]. Infiltration of the worm into the network occurred 
through the unprotected USB drives on controller PCs 
and infestation was propagated to other PCs through 
other unprotected network devices which supported 
USB drives, such as printers and scanners [6]. The 
Stuxnet worm was developed to target the 
programmable logic controllers (PLCs) utilised within 
the refinery. PLCs are specialised computing devices 
with sensor capability that controls “automated 
physical processes” [5]. In the case of the Iranian 
nuclear facilities, the PLCs were responsible for 
controlling the rotational speed of the centrifuges [6]. 
The results of various forensic investigations 
reported the following on the effects of Stuxnet: 
 A total of approximately 100,000 total hosts were 
infected by Stuxnet, 58.31% of which were situated 
in Iran [7]. 
 Approximately 12,000 initial infections could be 
traced back to five Iranian organisations [7]. 
 The shortest time between compile and infection 
time was 12 hours, the longest time was 28 days 
and the average time was 19 days [7]. 
 Of the 9,000 centrifuges deployed at the Natanz 
facility, about 1,000 of the centrifuges were 
decommissioned. The proximity of the 
decommission date to the discovery of the Stuxnet 
worm has led to the conclusion that the centrifuges 
were damaged as a result of Stuxnet, though it was 
not officially confirmed [1]. 
 Owing to a shortage of raw material, Iran only had 
the facility to build 12,000 - 15,000 centrifuges. 
With the loss of 1,000 centrifuges to routine 
operational breakdowns, the additional loss of 
1,000 to Stuxnet was significant [1]. 
 Recovery from the effects of Stuxnet took the 
Natanz facility approximately 6 months to 
accomplish [24].  
With consideration of the vulnerabilities and threats 
exploited by the Stuxnet worm and the reported effects 
of the worm, a risk analysis of the infected CPS can be 
conducted through the application of the developed 
risk model.  
Table 6: Risk analysis of the Natanz CPS 
Risk 
Variable 
Calculation Score 
EP  
[0.0-20.0] 
Ep = 
58,310
100,000
 × 20 11.662 
AP   
[0.0-20.0] 
AP =  20 − (
9.5 days
14 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠
 × 20) 6.429 
AC 
[0.0-20.0] 
AC =  20 − (
9.5 days
14 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠
 × 20) 6.429 
DS  
[0.0-8.0] 
10% damage= 
1,000
9,000
 × 100 1.0 
DE  
[0.0-12.0] 
No known damage 0.0 
DH  
[0.0-20.0] 
No known injuries or deaths 0.0 
P  
[0.0-1.0] 
Probability of reoccurrence 0.40 
PSR  
[0.0-
100.0] 
Recovered within 6 months but 
utilised more of the limited raw 
material to engineer an 
additional 1,000 centrifuges [1], 
[24] 
40.0 
CF  
[/40.0] 
CF = DS+ DE+ DH 1.0 
RI  
[/100.0] 
RI = EP + AP + AC + CF 25.804 
SRS SRS = P x [RI - PSR] -5.792 
 It can be seen that an analysis of the Stuxnet 
infestation at Natanz, from the known information of 
its effects, results in a Mitigation 5 risk score. This is 
owing to the lack of environmental damage or 
incidents of injury or death. The score of 1.0 for 
system damage represents the interpretation of 
repairable damage with 10% of the damage written off. 
This is indicative of the required replacement of the 
ruined centrifuges, and the resultant loss of Iran’s 
limited raw materials, and the continued operation of 
the facility. The infection time is equally divided 
between the physical and cyber access score 
calculations, as details on the individual compromise 
times are not specified. Although the risk associated 
with Stuxnet was mitigated, at Mitigation level 5; 
Natanz barely avoided an even more devastating result. 
Had the Stuxnet worm been programmed to cause 
more damage, or had the centrifuges failed in a more 
catastrophic manner, resulting in injury to the 
employees at Natanz or damage to the surrounding 
environment, the results of the risk analysis would 
have been within a Security Risk level, and thus 
become a matter needing more urgent attention in the 
Information Security domain. 
 As the situation stands, knowledge of the potential 
danger their systems faced to a devastating security 
attack could have encouraged better security practices 
at Natanz. Actions could have been taken to prevent 
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the leakage of sensitive, facility layout and 
configuration information through the widely televised 
walkthrough tours, as analysed in [13], and best 
practice policies could have been implemented 
regarding the connection personal external devices 
such as USB sticks. In addition, awareness of the 
system’s vulnerability to a security attack could have 
resulted in the earlier detection of the worm as a 
possible cause to the repeated damage to the 
centrifuges; reducing the overall effectiveness of the 
cyber-physical attack. 
 
5. Discussion 
  
Methods for risk quantification in CPS security are 
still a growing research area however, they are 
important as they provide the mechanism to identify 
the areas of high vulnerability, and consequently high 
risk, in a CPS in addition to assisting one in identifying 
the order in which solutions for CPS security need to 
be developed. In terms of the wider information 
security domain, risk analysis techniques and models 
aid in illustrating the need for digital forensic readiness 
strategies in an environment where, as the application 
of technology in everyday business operations 
continues to grow, so too does the threat of a major 
security breach.  
 The proposed model provides an overview of the 
system security that can be utilised during initial 
system design or when conducting risk evaluations. 
This allows the owners of the CPSs the opportunity to 
conduct thorough risk planning and decide which risks 
can be absorbed by the system, which risks can be 
mitigated or which risks can be outsourced to be 
handled by a third party. The proposed risk model also 
gives allowance for the development of forensic 
readiness and system recovery strategies for the 
eventuality of an attack. The results of this are better, 
more secure network designs. The simplicity of the 
model means that it can be integrated as part of 
scheduled CPS maintenance practices. This allows for 
the continuous monitoring of the state of the CPS’s 
security, especially in cases were alterations are made 
to the system structure. The result is CPSs that are 
constantly secured from security attacks and are given 
allowance for the early detection of any changes to the 
security state. This could result in the quicker 
application of defensive measures on the system 
network and prevent damaging security attacks prior to 
their occurrence. 
 Apart from applications in CPSs, the proposed 
model can also be adjusted for use in the wider 
information security domain as part of the development 
of readiness strategies. Calculations involving the 
physical domain of a CPS can be interpreted as 
applying to the physical domain of an IT organisation – 
allowing analysists to take into consideration the risks 
associated with damage as a consequence of forced 
entry into the organisation or cyber-attacks as a result 
of insider informants and perpetrators. The calculations 
surrounding damage to human life can be adjusted to 
consider the costs of employee retrenchment packages 
in the event of job losses as a result of a major security 
breach, to give one example.  
 More importantly, in proposing a simple and 
scalable risk analysis model, the authors aim to address 
two of the four major “security apocalypse horsemen” 
[20] namely security risk quantification and bridging 
the gap between security and business risk in addition 
to encouraging risk-driven specification in future CPS 
security solutions. Risk-driven specification is 
especially important in safety or mission critical CPSs 
as this allows developers to identify the states and 
conditions that must not be allowed to occur as a result 
of a security failure in addition to allowing for the 
increased survivability and resilience of CPSs, making 
them less attractive targets to malicious attackers [12]. 
 The major problem facing the proposed model is 
one of subjectivity. The nature of risk analysis is that 
an element of subjectivity is always retained. Risk 
analysis is highly dependent on the bias of the person 
conducting the analysis and results could vary between 
analyses. While the model attempts to limit instances 
of subject bias through the use of independently, 
quantifiable metrics, it is still subjective to bias in the 
determination of the damage caused by system failure, 
the recovery potential of the system and the probability 
of the system coming under attack through the use of 
the identified threat or vulnerability. 
 
6. Conclusion 
  
 It can be seen that in order for the development of 
successful CPS security solutions to occur, an 
understanding of the impact of a security failure is 
needed. Risk assessment models designed specifically 
for CPS security, such as the models proposed in this 
paper and in [25], are being developed with the focus 
on the threats and vulnerabilities that occur owing to 
the joining of cyber and physical processes. The 
proposed model is able to quantify the impact that a 
security failure could have on a system, adjust for 
recoverability in the event of a security failure and 
quantify the urgency needed for the development of 
solutions which address high risk threats and 
vulnerabilities. This allows for the easier identification 
of areas where CPS security solutions may be lacking.  
 As part of further work, a detailed analysis of 
additional CPSs shall be conducted in order to further 
verify the model’s viability. An analysis of the current 
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state of CPS security using the proposed model shall 
also be conducted in order to objectively compare the 
effectiveness of previously proposed solutions for 
securing CPSs and to identify areas where solution 
development has been lacking, so to begin work in 
developing a lightweight security framework for CPSs. 
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